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The Gun-Slave Hypothesis is the long-standing idea that European gunpowder technology 
played a key role in growing the transatlantic slave trade. I combine annual data from the 
Transatlantic Slave Trade Database and the Anglo-African Trade Statistics to estimate a 
Vector Error Correction Model of the 18th century British slave trade that captures four 
versions of the Gun-Slave Hypothesis: guns-for-slaves-in-exchange, guns-for-slaves-in-
production, slaves-for-guns-derived and the gun-slave cycle. Three econometric results 
emerge. (1) Gunpowder imports and slave exports were co-integrated in a long-run 
equilibrium relationship. (2) Positive deviations from equilibrium gunpowder “produced” 
additional slave exports. This guns-for-slaves-in-production result survives 17 placebo tests 
that replace gunpowder with non-lethal commodities imports. It is also confirmed by an 
instrumental variables estimation that uses excess capacity in the British gunpowder industry 
as an instrument for gunpowder. (3) Additional slave exports attracted additional gunpowder 
imports for 2-3 more years. Together these dynamics formed a gun-slave cycle. Impulse-
response functions generate large increases in slave export in response to increases in 
gunpowder imports. I use these results to explain the growth of slave exports along the 
Guinea Coast of Africa in the 18th century. 
 
* For comments on earlier versions I want to thank Ran Abramitzsky, Sandy Darity, David Eltis, 
Stanley Engerman, Price Fishback, Avner Greif, Tim Guinnane, Philip Hoffman, Joseph Inikori, 
Robert Margo, Nathan Nunn, Roger Ransom, Paul Rhode, Gary Richardson, Jean-Laurent 
Rosenthal, Peter Rousseau, Gary Solon, Mel Stephens, Gavin Wright; seminar participants at the 
University of Michigan, Stanford, Yale and Utah; and conference participants at ASWAD, the 
Annual Cliometrics Conference, the Annual Meetings of the Economic History Association and the 
African Studies Association, the All-UC Economic History conference and the NBER Summer 
Institute on the Development of the American Economy. I also want to acknowledge the invaluable 
comments of three referees of this journal. All remaining errors are mine.  
 1 
“…it was not the war which was the cause of the Slave Trade, but the Slave Trade which 
was the cause of the war.” 
Thomas Clarkson (1839, p. 167). 
 
"Previous to my being in this employ, I entertained a belief that the kings and principal men 
[in Africa] breed Negroes for sale as we do cattle. All the information I could procure 
confirms me in the belief that to kidnapping, the trade owes its key support. " 
Alexander Falconbridge (1788, p. 15). 
 
 
1   INTRODUCTION 
According to the Transatlantic Slave Trade Database (2009), the trans-Atlantic slave trade 
carried more than 13 million enslaved Africans from the coast of Africa destined for the 
Americas. What social factors lay behind this human traffic? For Thomas Clarkson, the 
intellectual leader of the British Abolition Movement, this question went to the heart of the 
matter – to the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the trade itself. According to the dominant 
Natural Rights philosophy of the time, if African slaves were captured in “justified” wars 
among African peoples who were caught in the “natural” struggles of nation building, then 
the victors had every right to enslave the vanquished because they had justly chosen to spare 
their lives. On the other hand, if “it was the slave trade which was the cause of the wars” 
then nobody had a right to the victims, not the African captors nor their British trading 
partners.1 Alexander Falconbridge’s admission, while less philosophical than Clarkson’s, is 
probably closer to the typical layman’s query: did African societies produce human slaves 
in their normal course of affairs, or did the international slave trade cause the enslavement? 
 
There is still no scholarly consensus on this important issue. Was the Abolitionist’s view 
just propaganda or was it the truth (to which Britons agreed in 1807)? Did British traders 
encourage enslavement or were the slaves there for the taking? A number of important 
1 For a full elaboration of this critique see Clarkson (1786), his award-winning Oxford essay that launched his career 
as a major figure in the British abolition movement. Also see Patterson (1982) who calls the process of enslavement 
“social death” regardless of justification.  
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debates could benefit from a clearer answer to this question, not least the debate about why 
Britain abolished its slave trade in 1807. 
 
Historical studies of the transatlantic slave trade also line up on one side of this issue or the 
other. Were the major determinants of growth in the international slave trade internal to 
Africa or external to Africa? One school emphasizes external shocks and how they increased 
the supply of slave exports. Shocks include the American demand for plantation labor and 
the introduction of gunpowder technology into the African context. This view is most 
forcefully argued by Walter Rodney in How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (1972, chapter 
4), but it is also found in the writings of Basil Davidson (1961), Kwame Daaku (1970), A. 
G. Hopkins (1973), Joseph Inikori (1982), Robin Law (1991), Nathan Nunn (2008), 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2010) and others.2 A second approach emphasizes the 
contributions of pre-existing African conditions like low labor productivity, drought, and 
the ancient tradition of slavery and slave trading in Africa. The strongest modern proponent 
of this view is John Thornton in Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 
1400-1800 (1998, chs. 3 and 4), but similar emphases can be found in John Fage (1969), 
Philip Curtin (1975a), David Eltis (1987), Fenske and Kala (2015), Gareth Austin (2008a, 
2008b) and Sean Stillwell (2014).3 Finally, a third approach tends to be more theoretical in 
nature and seeks to understand the dynamic interaction between external shocks like 
gunpowder imports and internal conditions like the structure of African polities. Examples 
include Jack Goody’s Technology, Tradition and the State in Africa (1971), Stefano 
Fenoaltea (1999) and Gemery and Hogendorn (1997).4 
 
2 Rodney (1972, p. 135): “It is clearly ridiculous to assert that contacts with Europe built or benefited Africa in the 
precolonial era… The truth is that a developing Africa went into slave trading and European commercial relations as 
into a gale-force wind, which shipwrecked a few societies, set many others off course, and generally slowed down 
the rate of advance.” 
3 Thornton (1998, p. 73): “When Rodney presented his conclusions on the negative impact and hence special status 
of the slave trade as a branch of trade, it was quickly contested by J. D. Fage, and more recently the transformation 
thesis has been attacked by David Eltis. As these scholars see it, slavery was wide-spread and indigenous in African 
society, as was, naturally enough, a commerce in slaves. Europeans simply tapped this existing market, and Africans 
responded to the increased demand over the centuries by providing more slaves.” 
4 Goody (1971, p. 39): “It is necessary to remind the reader that, in talking of pre-colonial states, I do not imply that 
such states were uninfluenced by the advent of Europeans to the coastal areas of Africa. The import of guns and the 
external demand for slaves encouraged the war-like proclivities of centralized government and consequently the 
nature of their interaction with other people.” 
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This paper falls into the third group, but it is an empirical study rather than a theoretical 
one. It contributes to the debate by documenting the dynamic interactions between 
imported European gunpowder technology and exported African slaves -- what has been 
called the Gun-Slave Hypothesis. Existing evidence for-or-against this hypothesis is far 
from conclusive, consisting of a few observations on the growth of firearms imports, better 
data on slave exports, and the writings of contemporary observers stationed along the coast 
of Africa.  
 
I find at least four (4) versions, or pieces, of the gun-slave hypothesis mentioned 
throughout the literature on the transatlantic slave trade. Each lines up with a particular 
side of the debate concerning external vs. internal contributions to growth. One version of 
the hypothesis, what I call guns-for-slaves-in-production, argues that the imported 
gunpowder technology increased “productivity” in capturing slaves and marching them to 
the coast.5 Here, an external factor (European gunpowder technology) increases slave 
exports by increasing the productivity of African resources devoted to slaving. Running in 
the opposite direction is a version of the hypothesis I call slaves-for-guns-derived, which 
claims that it was African-induced increases in slave exports that attracted the European 
gunpowder technology to Africa. A third version of the hypothesis claims that the two 
processes reinforced each other and accelerated into a self-perpetuating gun-slave cycle 
which neither side could escape. A fourth version of the hypothesis, guns-for-slaves-in-
exchange, claims that the productivity advantage of guns shows up as a preference for the 
gunpowder technology among African slave traders. 
 
I test these claims by documenting the dynamic interaction between gunpowder imports 
and slave exports in the 18th century British slave trade. The data come from the 
Transatlantic Slave Trade Database and the heretofore-underutilized Anglo-African Trade 
Statistics (1990).6  I combine these data to build a time-series of annual observations on 
commodity flows and slave flows between 1699 and 1807. The time-series allow me to 
5 The term “production” should be interpreted to mean the allocation of resources to institutions that facilitate the 
capture and transport of people as slaves. For a discussions of the dialectical relationship between slave capture and 
slave trading in the African context, see Meillassoux (1991).  
6 I am aware of two other studies that have used this data: Richardson (1991) and Gemery and Hogendorn (1990). 
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estimate within-year and between-year correlations between British gunpowder shipment 
to Africa and British slave purchases on the African coast. For our purposes, gunpowder is 
a better measure than guns because it is a continuous and homogeneous measure of the 
capacity of the gunpowder technology.  
 
I specify a vector error-correction model (VEC) that estimates the intertemporal 
relationships among three endogenous variables: CARGO, which measures the annual 
value of British goods exchanged for slaves; SLAVES, which measures the annual number 
of slaves that CARGO purchased; and GUNPOWDER, which measures the annual value 
of British gunpowder exported to Africa. Three results emerge. First, the three endogenous 
variables are found to be co-integrated in a long-run equilibrium relationship that spanned 
the 18th century. In other words, GUNPOWDER and slave price (CARGO/SLAVES) were 
systematically related to each other. Second, deviations from long-run equilibrium set in 
motion adjustments among the variables that returned the system toward equilibrium. 
When gunpowder imports were above their equilibrium level, next years’ slave exports 
increased. This is taken to be evidence of guns-for-slaves-in-production (which takes time) 
as opposed to guns-for-slaves-in-exchange (which is a cotemporaneous transaction). 
Similar results are produced by an instrumental variables estimation of the slave export 
equation that uses excess capacity in the British gunpowder industry as an instrument for 
British gunpowder exports. This guns-for-slaves-in-production result also survives 17 
placebo tests that replace gunpowder with non-lethal British imports. Third, slaves-for-
guns-derived shows up in the coefficients on lagged slave exports. Increases in slave 
exports attracted additional gunpowder imports for 2-3 more years. 
 
Together, the estimated coefficients of the VEC model document a gun-slave cycle as a 
general dynamic feature of the 18th century British slave trade. Assuming that the flow of 
information from Africa to Britain followed shipping routes in the North Atlantic, 
impulse-response functions estimate large increases in African slave exports in response to 
exogenous increases in British gunpowder imports. A one percent increase in gunpowder 
set in motion a 5-year gun-slave cycle that increased slave exports by an average of 50%, 
and the impact continued to grow over time  
 5 
 These results have implications for a variety of issues in African economic history. The 
shock to African economies was large and widespread, not small or localized. The 
corresponding re-allocation of resources towards slaving and away from other economic 
activities must have been large as well. A cross-section of cases would tend to under-
estimate the significance of guns in the production of slaves because snapshots limit the 
notion of productivity to technical productivity in specific battles or raids. A virtue of the 
aggregate time series data is its ability to trace the broader and longer-term impact of 
gunpowder as it worked its way through African social relations over time.  
 
The study also provides important historical and empirical context for recent econometric 
research that document long-term negative consequences of the slave trade for Africa. 7 
The primary evidence reported in those studies is a negative statistical relationship 
between regional slave exports in the past and social and economic outcomes centuries 
later. This line of research has been criticized for “compressing” history because it glosses 
over historical detail, like whether or not the shock of the slave trade was large enough to 
leave indelible marks on African societies for so long (Austin, 2008a). This study provides 
empirical evidence that the 18th century shock was large.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the major literature that 
addresses the four (4) versions of the gun-slave hypothesis. Section 3 describes the data 
used in the econometric analysis. Section 4 discusses econometric issues and presents the 
econometric results. Section 5 discusses implications for the economic history of West 
Africa and for future research on the slave trade in Africa. Section 6 offers concluding 
remarks. 
 
2. THE GUN-SLAVE HYPOTHESIS 
European shipments of firearms to Africa accelerated in the late 17th and early 18th 
7 For examples of this growing literature, see Nunn (2008), Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), Obikili (2016), Whatley 
(2014), Whatley and Gillzeau (2011a, 2011b) and Dalton and Leung (2014) 
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centuries.8  This is also when African slave exports began to increase. Before then, the 
older matchlock musket proved ineffective in tropical climates and the Catholic Church 
prohibited their sale to non-Christians. The sale of large numbers of guns and gunpowder 
to Africans began with Protestant slave traders not bound by Catholic prohibitions. 9 The 
Dutch were the first to sell large numbers, followed by the English as their participation in 
the slave trade grew. Fearful of losing their competitive position, the Portuguese quickly 
followed suit. By the 1680s, the more-reliable flintlock technology was replacing the 
matchlock technology and firearms became a staple outbound cargo on most slave ships 
destined for Africa. By the 1690s, the new flintlock technology was influencing military 
formations and military strategies along the Lower Guinea Coast, precisely when slave 
exports from that region began to increase.10  
 
Thus began a period of sustained growth in both firearms shipments to Africa and slave 
exports out of Africa. Between 1680 and 1685, the British Royal African Company 
shipped only 2,615 firearms per year to Africa (Davies, 1975, p. 356). By the end of the 
18th century, Inikori (1977) estimates that the British were shipping 150,000 to 200,000 
guns per year, and the total for all Europe was 300,000-400,000 guns per year. Eltis and 
Jennings (1988), estimate a tenfold increase in firearms between the 1680s and the 1780s, 
increasing from 20,000 to 200,000 guns per year. Figure 3 reports the natural log of annual 
British gunpowder exports to Africa for the 18th century (from the Anglo-African Trade 
Statistics). The figure also reports the natural log of annual British slave purchases for the 
18th century (from the Transatlantic Slave Trade Database). The correlation coefficient is 
0.80.  
 
The core claim of the Gun-Slave Hypothesis is that the imported gunpowder technology 
increased the productivity of resources devoted to capturing slaves and marching them to 
the coast. If one thinks of the violent process of enslaving people and marching them to the 
coast against their will, one can imagine how firearms might give captors an advantage. 
8 Curtin (1975b, pp. 320-25); Inikori (1977); and Richards (1980).  
9 Kea (1971, p. 186), Wilks (1993, p. 23) and Northrup (2002, pp. 90 – 98). 
10 Kea (1971, pp. 207-213), Thornton (1999. pp. 61-64),  
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The question is how much of an advantage? In Europe, the strategic advantage was the 
projectile’s ability to pierce armor, something that was seldom worn in and around the 
rainforests of Africa. In Africa, the advantage was the projectile’s ability to cut through 
arrow-proofed shields and the thicket and overgrowth of forest that often served as cover 
for troops and escapees  (Thornton, 1999, pp. 58-59, 62-63, 105). Kea (1971) describes 
how the flintlock revolutionized military formations and strategies in the forests kingdoms 
of the Lower Guinea Coast. Thornton (1999, pp.31-32) describes how the flintlock 
allowed marksmen to cover wider gaps in infantry formations to slow the advance of 
cavalry.11 “Travel outside the homeland was dangerous” and those who ventured too far 
were subject to kidnap (Hair 1965, p. 198). Bandits, warlords and kidnappers carried guns. 
Merchants and caravans carried guns.  
 
But firearms were also effective defensive weapons, especially behind walls (Thornton 
1999, 50-51). They were used extensively to hunt elephants for ivory, to hunt for food, and 
to defend against predatory animals and people (White, 1971). The net advantage of 
firearms in the capture and transport of slaves is not a forgone conclusion. It is an 
empirical question that this study addresses by subjecting the gun-slave hypothesis to 
empirical scrutiny. 
 
In the historical literature one finds four versions of the gun-slave hypothesis, each 
emphasizing a different aspect of the gun-slave connection. I call them guns-for-slaves-in-
exchange, guns-for-slaves-in-production, slaves-for-guns-derived and the gun-slave cycle. 
Guns-for-slaves-in-exchange highlights the preference for firearms among African slave 
exporters. The preference is taken to be evidence of the advantage of guns in the capture 
and transport of slaves. Inikori (1977):  
 
"These imports (guns) were due very largely to the strong preference 
for firearms by slave sellers and gatherers.  The preference of ivory 
11 The “shock-and-awe” advantage was also a tactic learned early and often from encounters with Europeans. The 
early Portuguese traders were quick to display the power of their weaponry, and when British ships arrived on the 
coast of Africa to purchase slaves, they announced their arrival by firing rounds of canons (St. Clair, 2007, chapter 
1).  
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sellers for guns came a distant second to that of slave sellers.  Sellers 
of other commodities, particularly foodstuffs, do not seem to have 
had any stronger demand for firearms (p. 361).”  
 
Johnson (1966) reports the detailed of a number of contracts showing the exchange of 
cargo for slaves. Almost every contract included guns or gunpowder. Richardson (1979, 
pp. 312-315) report  data on the cargoes of a sample of slave ships out of Bristol and 
Liverpool between 1758 and 1806. Almost every ship carried a substantial cargo of guns 
and gunpowder. During the Seven Years War British traders claimed that guns and 
gunpowder “greased the trade” and that ships could not depart for Africa until the 
government granted British slave traders exemptions from the wartime prohibition on 
private gunpowder exports (West 1991, pp. 124-126).  
 
A second version of the gun-slave hypothesis is guns-for-slaves-in-production. This 
version highlights the use of firearms in the production of slaves. In 1730, the Dutch 
Director General at Elmina Castle described what he saw along the Gold Coast of Africa 
as guns-for-slaves-in-production: 
 
“The great quantity of guns and gunpowder which the Europeans have 
brought have caused terrible wars between the Kings and Princes and 
Caboceers of these lands, who made their prisoners of war slaves; 
these slaves were immediately bought up by Europeans at steadily 
increasing prices… (quoted in Richards, 1980, 46, emphasis added).” 
 
In his study of the 18th century Bambara Kingdom of Segu, located in the Middle Niger 
valley, Richard Roberts (1987) states: 
 
 “Making war not only gave slave warriors their specialized 
occupation; it gave them the means to renew their tools of production. 
Warriors needed a constant supply of weapons, including lances, 
horses, and after the mid-eighteenth century, steady supplies of 
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firearms, flints, lead shot, sulfur, and gunpowder (p. 35, emphasis 
added).” 
 
A third version of the hypothesis is slaves-for-guns-derived. This version emphasizes how 
African elites sought the latest military technology to fight nation-building wars for 
reasons that had little to do with the international slave trade. Any slaves who happened to 
be captured and exported were by-products of these politically-motivated wars.12 This 
view was fully developed by Curtin (1975a, pp. 156-168) in his discussion of the 
distinction between “political” and “economic” motivations for slave production. 
According to Curtin, politically-motivated slave exports were by-products of political 
campaigns of nation-building.13 The proclamation of King Ose Bonsu of Asante is often 
enlisted in support of this view: 
 
"I cannot make war to catch slaves in the Bush, like a thief.  My 
ancestors never did so.  But if I fight a king, and kill him when he is 
insolent, then certainly I must have his gold, and his slaves, and the 
people are mine too (quoted in DuPuis, 1824, p. 163)." 
 
Lastly, guns-for-slaves and slaves-for-guns are combined in a self-perpetuating gun-slave 
cycle.14 This is the version of the hypothesis described by Gemery and Hogendorn (1974) 
as a prisoners’ dilemma arms race of “raid or be raided:” 
 
“States playing no role in the slave trade, and therefore not receiving 
muskets in payment for slaves, found themselves on the losing side of 
an arms race. Their dilemma: without firearms defense was precarious. 
To get muskets, there must be something to export. The only item in 
12 See Northrup (2002, pp. 90-98) for an extensive discussion of the gun-slave hypothesis that emphasized this 
version. Also see Thornton (1998, p. 123). 
13 Under these conditions, slave exports will have zero or very low price elasticities of supply. A few estimates of 
supply elasticity exist, but these are average time-series correlations between quantity and price over long periods of 
time, and each estimate identifies the supply function by assuming it is stable over time. Estimates range from a low 
of one (Curtin, 1975, ch. 4; LeVeen, 1975; Grubb and Stitt, 1994) to a high of thirty-five (Gemery and Hogendorn, 
1977). 
14 What Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, ch. 12) call a “vicious cycle.”  
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great demand was slaves. Thus, it is not surprising that slave trading 
spread rapidly, especially in the eighteenth century when the flintlock 
replaced the cumbersome matchlock (p. 242).” 15 
 
The Dutch Director General at El Mina who was quoted earlier does not describe what he 
saw in 1730 as a prisoners’ dilemma arms race, but his quote continues along similar lines. 
The guns produced the slaves export:   
 
“…, which in its turn, animates again and again these people to renew 
their hostilities, and their hope of big and easy profits makes them 
forget all labor, using all sorts of pretexts to attack each other or 
revive old disputes (quoted in Richards, 1980, 46).” 
 
The gun-slave cycle essentially endogenizes the slaves-for-guns-derived channel by 
recognizing how the external slave trade influenced the economic, political and military 
motivations of Africans.16  
 
One of these four versions of the gun-slave hypothesis is mentioned in almost every major 
study of West Africa in the 18th century, but it is often dismissed as “too simple” an idea. 
Miller (1988), for example, refers to firearms as the "very soul of commerce" in the 
Angolan slave trade, but concludes that “[t]he ‘gun-slaves cycle’ in Western Central 
Africa was a much more complicated affair then the sheer unbridled violence sometimes 
inferred from the data on imports (pp. 93-94)." Curtin (1975a), after documenting a 
dramatic increase in gun imports into the Senegambia region in the 18th century (p. 321), 
nonetheless concludes that the “arms for slaves stereotype does not hold in the 18th 
century… (p. 325).” After a long review of the historiography of the gun-slave hypothesis, 
Northrup (2002) concludes that, “... while imports of firearms closely tracked exports of 
15 Examples of raid-or-be-raided dynamics can be found in Davidson (1961, pp. 142-43), Hawthorn (2003, pp. 96-
98) and Klein (2001, pp. 56, 58, 61).  
16 Roberts (1980, pp. 397-99) uses this feedback loop to criticize Curtin’s distinction between political and economic 
motivations for slaving in Africa: “In contrast to the arguments offered by… Curtin, I will present one that involves 
a more dynamic view… Instead, I will try to demonstrate the exact amount of productive activity which was central 
to the organization of warfare in the Middle Niger valley (p. 399).” 
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slaves, a guns for slaves equation is too simple to describe the complexities of political 
transformations (p. 97).”  Eltis and Jennings (1988), after documenting a tenfold increase 
in firearms imports between 1680 and 1780, conclude that "[t]hose claiming a major 
impact from arms will have to build their arguments on some basis other than just the 
volume of imports (p. 954)." Thornton (1998), who notes correctly that “…the simple 
correlation between imports of firearms and exports of slaves is not a causal relationship,” 
then, without proof, makes the following causal claim: “It is more likely that African 
demands for guns increased simply because they were creating larger armies, which itself 
had complicated internal social causes. The availability of European weapons did not 
provoke an increase in warfare (p. 123).” And as a final example, take Reid (2012). While 
acknowledging that “something approaching an arms race emerged in the seventeenth and, 
especially, the eighteenth centuries (p. 103),” he nonetheless concludes that “even though 
much of the political and military development in Atlantic Africa has been explained in 
terms of a gun-slave cycle, it is an oversimplification to do so… (p. 89).” 
 
Being a simple idea does not mean it is an unimportant idea. The gun-slave hypothesis is 
the simple claim that imported gunpowder technology (or any imported weaponry) was the 
source of improvements in the productivity of African resources devoted to capturing 
people and marching them to the coast. As the technology diffused across the African 
landscape it disrupted the balance of power among nations, cities and villages in a way that 
increased the kinds of social conflict that produced slaves. To quote Walter Rodney: 
“When one tries to measure the effect of European slave trading on the African continent, 
it is essential to realize that one is measuring the effect of social violence rather than trade 
in the normal sense of the word (1972, p. 95).” By the end of the 18th century the British 
gunpowder technology was absorbing 20 percent of the African revenues generated by the 
British slave trade (see Figure 1).17 Any productivity advantage would have appreciably 
increased the kinds of conflict and violence that produced slaves. 
 
17 There is no evidence of firearms manufacture in West Africa in the 18th century. Mungo Park (2000, pp 143-144) 
encountered the manufacture of low-quality gunpowder among the Moors on his way to Bambara country in March 
of 1796. Blacksmith repair of guns were more common (Kea 1971, pp. 205-206; White 1971, pp. 174-175). 
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3.   THE DATA 
This study uses time-series data to test the four versions of the gun-slave hypothesis. 
Production takes time, and time series data can track the intertemporal relationship 
between gunpowder imports and slave exports. The data come from the aggregate 18th 
century British slave trade, so the analysis abstracts from local and regional histories. 
Instead, the analysis focuses on documenting broader, inter-temporal dynamics between 
guns and slaves. What follows is a discussion of the three primary data series used in the 
empirical analysis: GUNPOWDER imports and SLAVES exports (to test the gun-slave 
hypotheses); and CARGO imports, to control for price dynamics 
(CARGO/SLAVES=average annual slave price). 
 
British Cargo. The British demand for slaves arrived on the coast of Africa as ships laden 
with cargo looking for slaves to buy. The gunpowder technology arrived as cargo items on 
these ships. African destinations were determined before ships left Britain, and cargos 
were carefully selected to meet the anticipated preferences of intended African 
consumers.18 The most popular items were textiles of various kinds, iron bars, firearms 
and other weapons, rum, cowrie shells and an array of manufactured goods. On the coast 
of Africa these commodities (CARGO) were traded for slaves who had been captured by 
Africans in wars and raids in the interior.  
 
Annual estimates of the value of CARGO come from the Anglo-African Trade Statistics. 
Observations run from 1699-1807.19 The data were recorded in the 18th century British 
Customs Office and later digitized by Marion Johnson et al (1990).20 The Anglo-African 
Trade Statistics do not record British slave purchases. Slaves were shipped to the 
Americas and never entered Britain. CARGO is calculates by taking the value of total 
18 The Anglo-African Trade Statistics do not report trade by region, but several studies have analyzed trade books 
and ships’ ledgers that document the regional variation in African preferences. See Metcalf (1987a, 1987b) and Eltis 
(2000, p. 168) for a sample. 
19 Data are missing for 1705 and 1712. These years are estimated by taking the average of the bracketing years. 
20 See Richardson (1991) for a discussion of countervailing biases in the Anglo-African Trade Statistics. On the one 
hand, Customs Office records underestimate British exports to Africa. Ships took on additional goods at non-British 
ports, at Channel Island and the Isle of Man; and between 1713 and 1730 many ships outbound for Madeira 
eventually sailed on to Africa. On the other hand, the Customs Office did not record imports of gold from Africa. No 
official British record of gold imports exists. No attempt has been made to correct for these omissions. After careful 
assessment, Richardson concluded that the two omissions probably cancelled each other out. 
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British commodity exports to Africa and subtracting the value of total African commodity 
exports to Britain. What is left is the value of CARGO that was used to purchase the slaves 
that were shipped to the Americas.  
 
The Anglo-African Trade Statistics are annual estimates of the real value of British 
CARGO. The British Customs Office set the value of trade goods at “official prices.” 
These were primarily 1699 prices that did not change over the sample period. Changes in 
CARGO, therefore, measure changes in the quantities of items shipped to Africa, not 
changes in their prices. It is the appropriate measure for our purposes because we want to 
investigate the responses of African slave exporters to changes in the number of cargo 
items they received, especially weapons.  
 
British gunpowder. The Anglo-Africa Trade Statistics do not record data on guns 
separately as a category of CARGO.21 CARGO does contain an annual time-series on 
gunpowder. For our purposes gunpowder is a better measure than guns. There were so 
many kinds of guns that it would prove difficult to construct a reliable annual index. Also, 
firearms are durable goods. Converting trade flows into annual stocks available for slave 
production would require estimates of depreciation rates, and ideally a different 
depreciation rate for each type of gun. Even if the stock of guns could be estimated, their 
capacity as weaponry was still largely determined by the amount of gunpowder available 
to activate the guns.  
 
Gunpowder, on the other hand, is a more homogeneous product and easier to handle 
quantitatively. While there were different grades of gunpowder, a poor grade was always 
shipped to Africa to match the poor quality of the firearms shipped to Africa.22 
Gunpowder is measured in standardized pounds or barrels, something we could not do for 
guns. And gunpowder does not last nearly as long as guns, especially in the humid 
21 We still do not know why. Marion Johnson et al. (1990), the scholars who digitized the Anglo-African Trade 
Statistics, believed guns were recorded in the category “wrought iron (p. 9).” Inikori (1977, p. 347) finds, in the 
British Parliamentary Papers, data on the value of firearm shipment between 1796 and 1805, so the data exist for 
that period. Other than this, a time series on British firearms shipments to Africa does not seem to exist. 
22 See Inikori (1977), West (1991, pp. 122-33) and Richards (1980) 
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tropics.23 The analysis that follows assumes that the flow of gunpowder largely determines 
the productive capacity of the gunpowder technology.  
 
Figure 1 shows the importance of the British gunpowder technology in the assortment of 
British goods shipped to Africa. As a share of British CARGO, gunpowder imports 
increased steadily during the first half of the 18th century, peaked at about 10 percent of 
CARGO in the 1760s and held steady or declined thereafter. If we add the available data 
on British firearms between 1792-1805, the share of British gunpowder technology in 
British CARGO increases by approximately ten percentage points.24 Adding knives and 
swords would increase the share of weaponry even further. A reasonable range for British 
weaponry exports to Africa in the late 18th century appears to be 20-25 percent of British 
CARGO. This is in line with other estimates. For the period 1758-1806, Richardson (1979, 
p. 312) estimates guns and gunpowder to be 25-33 percent of the British cargo into the 
New Calabar and Windward Coast slave trades, and about 20 percent of British cargo into 
the Gambia and Bonny slave trades. 
 
African slaves. Annual estimates of British slave purchases (SLAVES) come from the 
Transatlantic Slave Trade Database.25 The variable SLAVESt measures the annual number 
of slaves boarding the same British ships that carried CARGOt to Africa.26 Figure 2 
presents the data on annual British slave purchases, along with numbers for other nations. 
The British trade was largely confined to the 18th century, but it quickly became one of the 
largest slave trade in the world. The British trade mimics the trade of other nations, with 
rapid growth over the 18th century and sharp contractions in the 1740s, 1770s and 1790s. 
23 West (1991, p. 14) describes 18th century British-made gunpowder. “Not only might the gunpowder explode in 
transit but it was also highly susceptible to both damp, which would cause the grains to clog and become ineffective, 
and to damage due to violent movement which could break the grain.” Kea (1971) notes that “traders of the Gold 
Coast carefully examined gunpowder for dampness (p. 205).” 
24 These are values reported by Inikori (1977, p. 347). 
25 All data on slave export quantities are taken from the Transatlantic Slave Trade Database at 
www.slavevoyages.org. Downloaded 5/7/2013. 
26 For cut-off dates, the British Customs Office used Christmas-to-Christmas for 1699-1771 and January 5-to-
January 5 for 1772-1807 (Johnson, 1990, p. 13). If CARGOt measures the cargo leaving Britain in 1750, then 
SLAVESt measures the number of slaves leaving Africa on the ships that left Britain between Christmas 1749 and 
Christmas Eve 1750. 
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These contractions correspond to European military conflicts like the War of Austrian 
Succession, the American War for Independence and the Napoleonic Wars. These wars 
disrupted Atlantic trade generally, including the slave trade. 
 
4. ECONOMETRIC ISSUES AND ESTIMATES 
The vector-error-correction model. I use the three time series to test the four versions of 
the Gun-Slave Hypothesis. Figure 3, panel (a) displays the natural logs of CARGO, 
SLAVES and GUNPOWDER. Panel (b) displays annual changes in the natural logs. These 
two panels show that the data are non-stationary I(1) time-series. Each series increases 
over time while the annual changes in the series do not increase. Co-integration is also an 
issue. Price theory predicts co-integration between CARGO and SLAVES because 
CARGO/SLAVES equals the average annual price of slave (the real value of cargo per 
slave). Panel (c) displays the natural log of CARGO/SLAVES, and shows that CARGO 
and SLAVES were indeed co-integrated. Increases in CARGO could not proceed 
indefinitely without an eventual increase in SLAVES, and vise-versa.  
 
The co-integration of CARGO and SLAVES is evidence that there existed an international 
market for African slaves, one where demand and supply tended to equilibrate on price. 
The Gun-Slave Hypothesis claims that the imported gunpowder technology was also an 
integral part of this market and how it equilibrated over time. A natural first-order test, 
therefore, is to see if GUNPOWDER, SLAVES and CARGO form a long-run co-
integrated system.  
 
The vector-error-correction model (VECM) searches the 18th century British data for a co-
integrating vector (𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐,𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠,𝛽𝛽𝑔𝑔) such that 
 
𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 − 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 − 𝛽𝛽𝑔𝑔∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 
 
is stationary. If such a co-integrating vector exists, then CARGO, SLAVES AND 
GUNPOWDER formed a long-run equilibrium process that spanned the 18th century and 
around which the variables of the system fluctuated. This co-integrating vector could be 
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(𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐,𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠,𝛽𝛽𝑔𝑔) or a linear combination of vectors like (0,𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠1,𝛽𝛽𝑔𝑔1) and (𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐2, 0,𝛽𝛽𝑔𝑔2). There are 
three variables in the system, so there can be at most two independent co-integrating 
vectors. Deviations from equilibrium are equilibrium errors, or 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡.  𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡  is stationary 
because the system tends to return to equilibrium when the error is not equal to zero. 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 has 
mean zero and constant variance. 
 
The full VEC model adds to the error correction term a reduced-form vector auto-
regression model (VAR). The resulting first-order VEC model looks like this: 
 
∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 = 𝛾𝛾 + 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿 + 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠�𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝛽𝛽𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑣 + 𝜌𝜌𝛿𝛿� + 𝜃𝜃𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝜃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝜃𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 
∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 = 𝛾𝛾 + 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿 + 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐�𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝛽𝛽𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑣 + 𝜌𝜌𝛿𝛿� + 𝜃𝜃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝜃𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝜃𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1+ 𝜀𝜀𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 
∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 = 𝛾𝛾 + 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿 + 𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔�𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝛽𝛽𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑣 + 𝜌𝜌𝛿𝛿� + 𝜃𝜃𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝜃𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠 ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝜃𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 
 
The expression in parentheses is the equilibrium error, or the size of the annual deviations 
from long-run equilibrium. The 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠 estimate the speed at which the variables adjust to 
deviations from long-run equilibrium. The 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗s are estimates of past-dependence, or the 
effects of changes in the past on changes in the current period. For the sake of brevity, I 
have displayed a first-order VEC with one-period lags of the endogenous variables. The 
actual number of lags remains to be specified. 𝛾𝛾, 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿, 𝑣𝑣 𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎 𝜌𝜌𝛿𝛿 are linear and quadratic 
deterministic trends that also need to be specified. The 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 error terms are assumed to be 
individually serially uncorrelated white noise processes with zero mean and constant 
variance.27 
 
The model is flexible enough to capture all four versions of the Gun-Slave Hypothesis. 
Guns-for-slaves-in-exchange is captured by 𝛽𝛽𝑔𝑔, the estimate of co-integration between 
gunpowder and slave price over the long-term. Guns-for-slaves-in-production is captured 
by a slave response to either excess gunpowder imports (𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠) or past increases in 
gunpowder imports (𝜃𝜃𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔). Slaves-for-guns-derived is captured by a gunpowder response to 
27 The 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  are composites of the three error terms of a structural VAR. Since those are white noise processes, their 
composites are individually white noise processes. But since they are each composites of each other then they are 
correlated with each other. This becomes an issue when we estimate impulse-response models. The solution will be 
a Choleski decomposition.  
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either excess slave exports (𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔) or past increases in slave exports (𝜃𝜃𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠). A gun-slave cycle 
would be a pair of significant coefficients. One pair is (𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠, 𝜃𝜃𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠), where a history of 
increases in slave exports attracts additional gunpowder that Africans use to produce and 
export more slaves. The other pair is (𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔,𝜃𝜃𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔), where a history of increases in gunpowder 
imports produces additional slave exports that attract additional gunpowder.    
 
Specification Tests. Specification tests proceed as follows. First I test the model for 
optimal lag-length using a variety of methods. Once the lag-length is chosen, I test for co-
integration among the three dependent variables under different specifications of the 
deterministic trend. Third, I check to see if the preferred specifications exhibit any auto-
correlation in the errors. I remove autocorrelation by increasing the lag length. Finally, I 
check to see if the estimated long-run equilibrium relationship is stable over time. 
 
Table 1 reports five statistical tests for lag order. Four of the tests identify one-period as 
the optimal lag length. Table 2 reports Johansen rank test for co-integration among 
CARGO, SLAVES and GUNPOWDER under different constraints on the deterministic 
trends and with one-period lags. The rank of the coefficient matrix determines the number 
of independent co-integration relationships. The Johansen tests identify two cases of co-
integration.28  The first, Model 1, has rank=1, lag=1 and no trend. The second, Model 2, 
has rank=2, lag=1 and a restricted constant trend (𝑣𝑣 ≠ 0). 
 
Table 3 checks for autocorrelation in the errors of these two models. The first panel checks 
for autocorrelation when the dependent variables are lagged one period. Both models 
exhibit some autocorrelation. I then check for autocorrelation in second-order models. 
These also show autocorrelation. The 3-period and 4-period models also show 
autocorrelation. The autocorrelation disappears when I lag the dependent variables for 5 
28 Ender (2010, pp. 401-405). The Johansen rank test is a nested test. If the trace statistic for rank=0 is less than the 
5% critical value, then the test fails to reject rank=0 for the matrix. If this is the case, then the variables are I(1), not 
co-integrated and OLS in differences can be applied. If the trace statistic for rank=0 is greater than the 5% critical 
value, then the Johansen test proceeds to test for rank=1. If the test fails to reject rank=1 then the matrix of 
coefficients has rank=1 and the variables are I(1) and co-integrated. If the test rejects rank=1 then the Johansen test 
proceeds to test for rank=2. If the Johansen test rejects all possible ranks, then the variables are I(0) and OLS in 
levels can be apply. 
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periods.  The preferred specifications, therefore, are: Model 1 with rank=1, lag=5 and no 
trends; and Model 2 with rank=2, lag=5 and a restricted constant trend on the equilibrium 
path (𝑣𝑣 ≠ 0). 
 
Equilibrium dynamics. Table 4 reports the estimated co-integrating equations (the 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠). 
Since Model 1 has rank=1, it can have at most one co-integrating equations. Model 2 has 
rank=2 and can have two co-integrating equations. Each co-integration vector is unique up 
to a scalar, so the estimation procedure normalizes the equations by setting one of the 
coefficients equal to one.29 Models 1 and 2 impose the Johansen normalization 
restrictions.30 
 
All of the coefficients are highly significant. The estimated equation for Model 1 is ln (𝐶𝐶2.21 𝑙𝑙⁄ ) = ln𝐶𝐶1.82. CARGO and SLAVES are co-integrated through the price of 
slaves. Gunpowder is co-integrated with the price of slaves, some, but not all, through its 
co-integration with cargo. Model 2 reveals similar patterns.  
 
Table 5 reports the estimated speed of adjustment parameters (𝛼𝛼). The top panel reports 
estimated speed-of-adjustment parameters when slave exports are above long-run 
equilibrium. The second panel reports speed-of-adjustment parameters when gunpowder 
imports are above long-run equilibrium. Model 1 performs poorly. None of the variables 
adjust to deviations from long-run equilibrium, indicating that the model is not really one 
of co-integration. Model 2 performs better. In Equation 1, when the equilibrium error is 
positive, slaves are above their equilibrium level with cargo (meaning cargo/slaves=slave 
price is below its long-run equilibrium). The speed of adjustment parameters predict that 
all three variables will adjusted downward, with slave exports declining faster than cargo 
to restore long-run equilibrium price.  
 
Equation 2 of Model 2 tells us what happens when gunpowder is above its long-run 
equilibrium level. When this happens, none of the variable adjust with any degree of 
29 Enders (2010, pp. 359-360 and 371-373). 
30 These are the default normalization restriction imposed by STATA 13.1.  
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statistical significance. One adjustment, however, is close to statistical significance. When 
gunpowder is above its long-run equilibrium, slave exports increase: 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠 =.12 with a p-
value of .204. This is evidence of guns-for-slaves-in-production, although the standard 
error of the estimate is large. 
 
The standard error is large in part because British traders were not the only slave traders 
operating on the coast of Africa. Some British gunpowder was used to capture slaves who 
were eventually sold to French or Portuguese merchants. And some British purchases were 
captured by Africans slavers who used French or Portuguese gunpowder. Model W2 is 
designed to reduce these leakages and injections in the estimated relationship between 
British gunpowder imports and British slave purchases. Model W2 weights British 
gunpowder imports by the degree of British dominance in their major slave trading ports. 
The weight (W) is the British share of trade in the 18 ports where British traders purchased 
25,000 or more slaves over the course of the 18th century.  This represents approximately 
90 percent of all British slave purchases from known ports.31 As W approaches one, 
British trade in these ports approaches monopoly, and leakages and injections from 
competitors approach zero. At smaller W, leakages and injections are larger, so the 
weighting scheme treats British gunpowder as less effective at producing the slaves that 
British merchants ultimately purchase. Similarly, the weighted variable can now account 
for changes in the observed British gun-slave relationship that emanate from changes in 
W, holding GUNPOWDER constant.  
 
Column (3) of Tables 4 and 5 report the results for Model W2. The co-integrating 
equations change very little but the estimated speed of adjustment to excess gunpowder 
imports changes considerably. Now British slave exports increase significantly when 
British gunpowder is above long-run equilibrium: 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠 =.15 with a p-value of .053. Cargo 
also now responds positively to excess gunpowder: 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐 = .32 with a p-value of .007.  
 
31 The ports are Gambia and St. Louis in Senegambia; Ilse de Los and the Sierra Leone Estuary in Sierra Leone; 
Bassa and Cape Mount on the Windward Coast; Anombu and Cape Coast Castle on the Gold Coast; Benin and 
Whydah in the Bight of Benin; Bonny, Calabar, Cameroons and New Calabar in the Bight of Biafra; and Cabina, 
Congo River, Loango and Malembo in West Central Africa 
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A remaining issue with Model 2 and Model W2 is instability in co-integrating Equation 2. 
The first column of Figure 4 displays the predicted values of the co-integrating equations 
for Model W2. Stationarity requires that the predicted values fluctuate around zero. 
Equation 2, however, has an inverted U-shape that overestimates gunpowder’s share of 
cargo in the middle of the century. This could reflect changes in the nature of the 
gunpowder-cargo relationship sometime in the middle of the 18th century.32  The estimates 
of Models 2 and W2 imposed the Johansen constraints on the co-integrating equations. 
Under these constraints, Equation 2 estimates the relationship between gunpowder and 
cargo. For our purposes we might want to impose constraints that explicitly capture the 
dynamics between gunpowder and slaves.33  
 
Those constraints are imposed in Model W2.1 and are reported in column (4) of Tables 4 
and 5. Equation 1 still captures the long-run equilibrium relationship between slaves and 
cargo (slave price). Equation 2 now captures the long-run equilibrium relationship between 
gunpowder imports and slave exports. The second column of Figure 4 graphs the 
corresponding equilibrium errors for Model W2.1 and shows that both equilibrium 
equations are now stable over time. The estimate of guns-for-slaves-in-production is 
unchanged, but the estimated price dynamics change considerably. Now, when slave 
exports are above their equilibrium levels (and the slave price is low) the model predicts 
that British cargo exports will increase in the next year to take advantage of the lower 
slave price on the coast of Africa. This is a simpler and more reasonable market 
adjustment process than the one estimated by Model 2 and Model W2. Model W2.1, 
therefore, is taken to be the preferred specification. 
 
Past dependence. Table 6 reports the estimated coefficients on the lagged endogenous 
variables. The first panel reports the influences of past slave exports on the current values 
of each of the three endogenous variables. The second panel reports the influences of past 
32 West (1991, pp. 119-135) documents how British slave traders successfully petitioned Parliament for exemptions 
to the national prohibition on private gunpowder exports during the Seven-Years War (1756-62). This might 
explains the mid-century hump in the gunpowder share of cargo.  
33 “When there are multiple cointegrating vectors, any linear combination of those vectors is also a cointegrating 
vector… For example, if there are two cointegrating vectors in a three-variable system, there is a cointegrating 
vector for each bilateral pair of the variables. (Enders 2010, pp. 397-398).” 
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gunpowder imports on the current endogenous variable, and the third panel reports the 
influences of past cargo imports on current values. There is significant evidence of slaves-
for-guns-derived in the first panel. In Models 2 and 2.1 the influence of past slave exports 
on current gunpowder imports dates back three years. In Model W2 and W2.1 slaves-for-
guns dates back two years. The coefficients are large and statistically significant. When 
African slave exports increased, British gunpowder imports grew for another 2-3 years. 
 
Sensitivity test. In this section I look to see if the estimate of 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠 (guns-for-slaves-in-
production) is sensitive to the way CARGO is measured. The original measure of cargo = 
British exports - African imports. Alternative measures are these: cargo1 = cargo - indirect 
African imports; cargo_nog = cargo – gunpowder; cargo1_nog = cargo1 – gunpowder. 
Exports = British exports, and the other Export measures follow the same pattern as the 
corresponding cargo measures. None of these alternative measures of cargo change the 
result on 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠 (see Table 7). 
 
Placebo tests. I interpret 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠 to be an estimate of guns-for-slaves-in-production, as if 
excess gunpowder increased the production of African slaves for export. It could be the 
case that all excess commodity imports, not just gunpowder, produced additional slave 
exports, through a kind of commodity-for-slaves link. Slave exports were the dominant 
exchange earner in 18th century West Africa. Excess commodity imports of any kind could 
have produced additional slave exports because African slave-exporters (elites, polities or 
trade networks) were also the dominant commodity-importers. Was there anything unique 
about excess gunpowder and its intertemporal link to additional slave exports? 
 
Substituting non-lethal commodity imports for gunpowder imports can help address this 
issue. All cargo items exchanged for slaves but only guns, gunpowder and other weapons 
helped produce slaves in the sense that we are trying to identify. I substitute other 
commodities for gunpowder and re-estimate the system. I then look to see if any of the 




The Anglo-African Trade Statistics divide CARGO into 18 classes of commodities that 
together sum to the value of CARGO.34 I use 16 of these commodity classes in the placebo 
tests.35 The Anglo-African Trade Statistics also single out wrought-iron as a special sub-
class “because it is thought to contain firearms, a commodity conspicuously absent 
elsewhere in the statistics (Johnson, et al 1990, p. 24).” Call these 17 commodities 
PLACEBOs. The 17 PLACEBOs are substituted one-at-a-time for GUNPOWDER and the 
models are re-estimated. 
 
Table 8 reports the resulting estimates of 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠 (commodities-for-slaves-in-production). The 
first entry reproduces the gunpowder-for-slaves result. The estimate for wrought iron 
(which the authors of the dataset thought contains firearms) is statistically significant and 
similar in magnitude to the gunpowder estimate. The only other commodities that exhibit 
statistically significant coefficients are misc. manufactures, glass, and other textiles.36 The 
category iron and steel is almost significant with a p-value of 0.11 and includes shackles, 
chains, swords and the raw materials to produce shackles, chains and swords.37  
 
The magnitude of the effect. The VEC model identified and estimated three gun-slave 
dynamics in the 18th century British slave trade. First, gunpowder, slaves and cargo were 
co-integrated in a long-term equilibrium relationship that characterized the 18th century 
British slave trade. In this sense, gunpowder was an integral part of the 18th century British 
slave trade and how the international market adjusted to shocks. Second, positive 
deviations from equilibrium levels of gunpowder produced additional slave exports. Third, 
increases in African slave exports attracted additional gunpowder imports for 2-3 years. 
34 These are listed and described in Johnson, et al (1990), Table 2, page 24. “A product category is an agglomeration 
of related commodities with a single range broad enough to enhance clarity but narrow enough to retain interesting 
differences in development (p. 23).” 
35 I do not use Coins (which has only five non-zero entries) and Military Stores (because it includes 
GUNPOWDER). 
36 Some of these results may provide clues to the kinds of economic development taking place within slave trading 
networks. Iron, steel and wrought iron could have been intermediate imports for blacksmiths (see Hawthorne 2003, 
pp. 96-98; Bocoum 2004). Glass could have been an intermediate import for bead makers (see Christopher R. 
DeCorse 1989). Both had established occupations and markets in West Africa.  
37 In his discussion of an “iron-slave cycle” in coastal Guinea-Bissau, Walter Hawthorne (2003) writes “In sum, the 
need to obtain European weapons for defensive purposes may not have compelled Africans to conduct slave raids, 
but the need to obtain iron from which to forge practical defensive or offensive weapons – as well as cutting edges 
for digging tools – did compelled coastal Africans in Guinea-Bissau to produce and market captives (p. 97).” 
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Together, these gun-slave dynamics formed a gun-slave cycle. 
 
What was the effect on slave exports of a one percent increase in gunpowder imports? The 
increase in gunpowder would have to work its way through the gun-slave cycle. To answer 
this question we need to place some restrictions on the error terms in our model. The VEC 
errors (𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) are linear combinations of the pure errors from the structural VAR (𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  ). The 
structural VAR allows cotemporaneous interactions among the endogenous variables 
which preclude the use of OLS in estimating coefficients. The reduced-form VAR (which 
is the one estimated here with an error correction term) is derived from the structural VAR 
by dumping all of the cotemporaneous interactions into the error term. The resulting errors 
of the reduced-form VAR (𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) are therefore linear combinations of the structural errors 
(𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  ) weighted by the coefficients of cotemporaneous interactions from the structural VAR 
(∅𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠). Each 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is a white noise process because the underlying pure innovations are white 
noise processes. The 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 however are not independent of each other. In order to trace the 
impact of a pure innovation in gunpowder (𝜖𝜖𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡) on slave exports we need to order the 
cotemporaneous interactions among the variables by setting some of the ∅𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 equal to zero. 
This is the Choleski decomposition.38  
 
What is the order of the cotemporaneous interactions among CARGOt, GUNPOWDERt 
and SLAVESt? The observations in our system are annual observations from the 18th 
century British Triangular Trade. A key question is this: could the level of SLAVE exports 
in year t influence the amount of GUNPOWDER shipped to Africa in year t? The answer 
depends on the length of time it took for information about market conditions on the coast 
of Africa (SLAVESt) to return to Britain and influence GUNPOWDERt.  
 
Figure 5 plots the number of days it took for the ships in the British sample to travel from 
Britain-to-Africa-to-America. The average duration approached 300 days. From there, the 
ventures had to sell their slaves in the Americas, restock provisions, secure a British-bound 
cargo of sugar and sail back to Britain. In Britain, they had to unload the American cargo, 
38 Enders (2010, pp 305-311 and 405-407). In a system of n variables, the Choleski decomposition requires 
parameterization of (𝑙𝑙2 − 𝑙𝑙 ) 2⁄  restrictions. In our case the number is three (3). 
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secure a new commission and crew, restock GUNPOWDER and set sail for Africa. In 
order for reliable information about supply conditions on the coast of Africa in year t to 
influence, in this way, the amounts of gunpowder shipped to Africa in year t, ships had to 
complete the cycle from Britain to Africa to America to Britain and then outbound to 
Africa again all within the calendar year t.39 Some of the first ships leaving in January 
might complete the triangle before the end of the calendar year, but the vast majority will 
not. The same applies to CARGOt.40  
 
This suggests two possible Choleski orderings: GUNPOWDERt  CARGOt  SLAVESt 
and CARGOt GUNPOWDERt  SLAVESt.41 The first ordering traces system responses 
to pure increases in gunpowder (𝜀𝜀𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 = 𝜖𝜖𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡). The second ordering traces system responses 
to a derived increase in gunpowder (𝜀𝜀𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 = 𝐹𝐹(𝜖𝜖𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡, 𝜖𝜖𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡)). The resulting cumulative impulse-
response functions are graphed in Figure 6. The estimated response of slave exports to 
increases in gunpowder never dies out, even after 20 years. This is the case for both 
Choleski orderings and for both the weighted and unweighted models. The size of the 
response is larger for the GUNPOWDERt  CARGOt  SLAVESt ordering. This ordering 
simulates situations like the Seven Years War, when British slave traders sat in London 
Harbor waiting for government permission to export gunpowder to Africa.42 This ordering 
probably also held during transitions from war to peace, when excess capacity in the 
British gunpowder industry was used to produce cheap and abundant gunpowder for 
Africa (as will be discussed later). The average impulse-response was probably somewhere 
between the first and second orderings. A one percent increase in gunpowder set in motion 
39 This was the nature of the Triangular Trade. Because of ocean currents and prevailing winds, information in the 
northern hemisphere of the Atlantic Ocean tended to flow in a clockwise direction. 
40 This ordering finds support in the estimates of past-dependence reported in Table 6. There, changes in SLAVES 
have a lagged effect on changes in GUNPOWDER and CARGO. 
41 The first ordering sets ∅𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠 = ∅𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐 = ∅𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 = 0. The second ordering sets ∅𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 = ∅𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 = ∅𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠 = 0. 
42 Prohibition on the private export of gunpowder and guns was established by Parliamentary Act in April of 1756. 
According to West (1991), “Liverpool merchants told the Privy Council in May of 1756 that it was impossible to 
undertake trade to Africa without gunpowder and arms.... [T]hey requested that the Liverpool Customs officers be 
given power to inspect and permit movement of shipments without license…. On 5 October the Privy Council 
reported to the Board that… the merchants of Liverpool would be permitted to export such quantities of gunpowder, 
arms and ammunition as necessary for trade and the defense of ships… agreement for general license also given to 
the Society of Merchant Adventurers of Bristol. (pp. 124-5).” London merchants “stressed that the legislation had 
resulted in ships lying in the Thames with valuable assorted cargoes, manned at great expense yet unable to proceed 
for want of powder. (p. 126)” 
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a 5 year gun-slave cycle that increased slave exports by an average of 50%, and the impact 
continued to grow over time.   
 
Instrumental variables estimates. In this section I develop an instrumental variables 
estimation of guns-for-slaves-in-production building on the specification tests already 
performed. Column 1 of Table 9 reports the results of a simple regression of ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙SLAVESt 
on ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙CARGOt and ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙GUNPOWDERt with a 5-period lag of the error term. The 
coefficient on cargo shows that the estimated elasticity of slave exports with respect to £1 
worth of the average cargo basket (which includes gunpowder) is 0.44. The coefficient on 
gunpowder shows that £1 worth of gunpowder secured 13 percent more slaves than £1 
worth of the average cargo basket. This is evidence of a preference for gunpowder among 
African slave traders.43 Column (2) lags the three variables for four periods. This matches 
the VEC specification. The estimate of guns-for-slaves-in-exchange is now 21 percent. 
The lags reveals how additional gunpowder imports and slave exports were correlated over 
a four year period. The immediate impact multiplier of gunpowder on slaves is 21 percent. 
The 5-year multiplier is 36 percent.44 Column (3) reports estimates using weighted 
gunpowder. The immediate impact multiplier drops to 17 percent and the 5-year multiplier 
increase to 40 percent. The 5-year multipliers are similar in magnitude to the cumulative 
impulse-response multipliers 5-years out.  
 
The VEC estimates revealed significant interactions among the three variables, so it is best 
to perform an instrumental variables estimation of guns-for-slaves-in-production. As in the 
VEC specification, guns-for-slaves is taken to be the impact of last year’s gunpowder on 
this year’s slave exports. Table 10 reports the results of a search for an instrument for 
gunpowder. I regress gunpowder on a number of variables that might capture variations in 
43 Cargo items are valued in 1699 prices, so these are the real British values per slave paid by African slave traders 
on the coast of Africa. The coefficient on gunpowder says that British merchants received 13% more slaves on the 
coast of Africa for a £ of gunpowder than for a £ worth of the average cargo bundle. As Inikori (1977, p. 340) states: 
“The very high demand for guns which prevailed in West Africa in the 18th century is reflected in the fact that £1 
sterling of guns had a much higher purchasing power in West Africa than £1 sterling of other goods.” Presumably, 
African slave traders were willing to pay a coastal premium of 13 percent because they knew the internal consumers 
who would cover it – namely, interior slave producers and slave traders.   
44 In Auto Regressive Distributed Lag models like this one, the long-run multiplier is  ∑ 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=0 (1 − ∑ 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗)𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1⁄ , where 
a is the coefficient on the independent variable and b is the coefficient on the dependent variable 
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gunpowder but be independent of variations in slaves and cargo. The first potential IV is a 
measure of excess capacity in the British gunpowder industry. The index is constructed 
from data found in Mitchell’s British Historical Statistics (1988, pages 578-580). The 
index, called EXCESS_CAPACITY, is the previous peak level of central government 
spending on ordnances minus the current level of central government spending on 
ordnances.45 The British Ordnance Office was the major purchaser of gunpowder in 
Britain. Wartime demands always expanded industry capacity, but demand always 
collapsed at the end of hostilities, leaving excess industrial capacity to produce a 
commodity that was costly to store.46 Under these conditions, the excess capacity could be 
used to produce gunpowder for Africa at very low opportunity cost. The first column of 
Table 10 shows that current gunpowder exports to Africa were highly correlated with 
current and future excess-capacity in the gunpowder industry. It was as if cheap 
gunpowder was available for private export to Africa once a permanent peace in the 
European theater had been secured.  
 
The second column reports regressions of gunpowder on a dummy variable called WAR, 
which take the value 1 during years of hostility, zero otherwise.47  The regression shows 
that war depressed gunpowder exports, but only weakly. War is also likely to depress 
cargo and slaves, which makes it an unlikely instrument for gunpowder in this context. 
The third column regress gunpowder on British war casualties, and shows no significant 
correlation between the two.48  
 
Table 11 reports IV results using the statistically significant EXCESS_CAPACITY 
45 EXCESS_CAPACITY is sometimes negative during war years (nine observations). The natural log is not defined 
for those years. To handle this, the negative years are set to .01. 
46 Volatility in both government purchases and industry demand is clearly documented in West (1991): “The period 
of peace demonstrates severe problems for gunpowder makers. They had no government employment, due to the 
inability of the Ordnance Office to agree contracts prematurely for a substance which could not be stored 
indefinitely. They were therefore dependent entirely on private trade (p. 5).” 
47 The wars are the War of Spanish Succession (1701-1711), the War of Quadruple Alliance (1718-1719), the War 
with Spain (1727-29), the War of Austrian Succession (1743-1748), the Seven Years War (1756-1762), the 
American Revolutionary War (1775-1782), and the Great French Wars (1793-1801 and 1803-1807). The variable 
WAR=1 for years of British involvement in these conflicts, zero otherwise.   
48 The measure of war casualties is the annual UK war casualty data found in Clodfelter (2002). I thank Mark 
Dincecco for sharing this data with me. 
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measures from Table 10 as instruments for last year’s gunpowder. Results are reported for 
unweighted and weighted gunpowder. The bottom panel reports first-stage results. In the 
first stage, EXCESS_CAPACITY performs well as an instrument for last year’s 
gunpowder imports. For the unweighted model, the Shea partial R-square is 0.16 and the 
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic is 7.22. For the weighted model the partial R-square is 0.12 
and the F-statistic is 3.79. The weaker performance of the weighted model is due to the 
fact that EXCESS_CAPACITY is not a good predictor of the British share of trade in 
African ports (W). 
 
The top panel of Table 11 reports second stage results. Both models estimate guns-for-
slaves-in-production to be 18-19 percent, similar in magnitude to the 12-15 percent 
estimated by the VEC model. The differences make sense. The IV model captures average 
slave responses to exogenous changes in gunpowder imports. The VEC model captures 
average slave responses to exogenous deviations of gunpowder from its long-run 
equilibrium level. This difference probably explain why the VEC estimates are smaller 
than the IV estimates. The F-statistic for the unweighted IV model exceeds the Stock-
Yogo critical value for 20% maximal IV relative bias. Both models pass the Hansen test 
for over-identification restriction. 
 
5. IMPLICATIONS FOR 18th CENTURY WEST AFRICAN HISTORY 
The estimated parameters of the VEC model reveal a dynamic relationship between 
gunpowder and slaves in the 18th century British slave trade. Increases in slave exports 
attracted British gunpowder to Africa, which Africans used to produce more slaves, and 
the cycle repeats. This is the gun-slave cycle. Impulse-response functions predict that once 
this dynamic is established, increases in gunpowder will have explosive effects on the 
future time-path of slave exports. These findings suggest a new direction for research on 
the slave trade in Africa: look for times and places of explosive growth in slave exports, 
identify what Jack Goody calls “the means of destruction (1971, ch. 3),” and document 
how the relationship between the two gets reproduced. 
 
Such an exercise is well beyond the scope of this paper. The 18th century African 
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landscape was dotted with literally hundreds of small polities, each engaged in their 
own local and regional geo-political struggles. 49 A few examples, however, might help 
convince the reader that this approach merits further consideration. 
 
Figure 7 reports time-trends of British slave exports and total slave exports for broad 
regions of the Guinea Coast of Africa. The bold lines are 6-degree polynomials that 
reflect changes in trends.  The first two panels show explosive growth in trends in the 
first half of the 18th century along the Gold Coast and the Bight of Benin. Is there 
evidence in the historical record of a gun-slave cycle operating here at this time?  
 
Most historians believe a gun-slave cycle operated here. Thornton (1999) states that 
“[h]ere it has been possible to speak of a ‘gunpowder revolution’ (p. 61).” According to 
Daaku (1970, 144-155), in the late 17th century the state of Denkyira was expanding 
territorially behind the Gold Coast, selling war captives and gold for guns and 
gunpowder. In the early 18th century several interior Akan clans joined forces to form 
the Asante Confederation to protect themselves from coastal powers like Denkyira. In 
1701 Asante fought for and won its independence from Denkyira. The victory was 
closely tied to Asante gaining access to firearms and blocking Denkyira access the 
firearms. Once secured, Asante embarked on an aggressive campaign of territorial 
expansion, such that by 1750 it claimed the majority of what is now the state of Ghana. 
Asante controlled its northern territories by prohibiting the flow of armaments 
northward (Wilks 1975, pp. 18-25). The Dutch Director General at El Mina who was 
quoted earlier in this paper was describing the gun-slave cycle along the Gold Coast in 
1730 (Richards, 1980, p. 46). 
 
Behind the Bight of Benin, a similar dynamic unfolded in the geo-political struggles 
between Alladah, Whydah, Dahomey and Oyo. According to Law (1991), by 1730 
these geo-political struggles culminated in the regional dominance of Dahomey, a 
49 All of the econometric studies cited in footnote 7 use the ethno-linguistic diversity in Africa recorded in Murdock 
(1967). A key issue is whether or not the observed ethnic diversity was influenced by the slave trade. See Whatley 
and Gillezeau (2011a, 2011b). 
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militarized state boasting a large standing army of riflemen. While the details differ, 
both nation-building efforts relied heavily on the import of firearms, the export of 
slaves and the control of the flow of guns (Kea, 1971, p. 201). These are the proto-
typical “slave-states” of West Africa, born in the era of the transatlantic slave trade and 
built on the import of guns and the export of slaves.  
 
But these are not the gun-slave cycles that the British data identify. British traders 
participated in the expansion along the Gold Coast, but they did not dominate the 
region. In the Bight of Benin they were never major players. The British data point to 
other possible gun-slave cycles. Candidates include the Bight of Biafra, the Windward 
Coast and Sierra Leone. Before mid-century these regions exported very few slaves, but 
beginning around 1740 each experienced explosive growth, with British traders leading 
the way. Senegambia shows a similar increase after 1740, but with major leakages and 
injections in the British gun-slave relationship coming from other nations. 
 
Developments behind the Bight of Biafra are well-documented. Long before 1740, a 
trading diaspora called the Aro came to dominate the Atlantic trade into and out of the 
hinterland. Around 1740 the structure of this trading network underwent some changes. 
For our purposes, the most significant change was the use of force to expand into the 
densely-populated Igbo heartland to the west. According to G. Ugo Nwokeji (2010): 
 
“Aro incursion into the densely populated Igbo heartland and the 
establishment there of their most important settlements in about the 
mid-18th century coincided with the steady increase observed in the 
Biafra trade during this time (p. 19).”50  
 
The Aro trade diaspora dates back to at least the mid-17th century, with its origin tied 
to the “introduction of firearms into the equation (Nwokeji 2010, p. 26).”  Unlike 
50 “In spite of the ties, strategies, and practices that facilitated the establishment of Aro settlements among the non-
Aro hosts, the Aro deemed force to be particularly effective in the Igbo heartland… Their massive and consistent 
application of force in this region is widely recognized as a-typical of Aro methods (Nwokeji 2010, p. 68).” 
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other trade diasporas, “the Aro almost always had access to military resources, which 
was often a decisive factor in their dealings with hinterland groups (p. 55).” The push 
into the Igbo heartland “manifested by the mid-eighteenth century in Bonny’s 
supersession of Old Calabar as the Biafra’s principal port just as the Aro expanded 
westward (p. 45).” The firearms coming into Bonny in exchange for these slaves were 
British-made firearms, known as Bonny rifles.51  
 
The export trends for Sierra Leone, Windward and Senegambia are more difficult to 
interpret because the inland geography behind the coast is complicated by a vast 
highland plateau. Transportation waterways fan out in all directions from these 
highlands, making it difficult to assign coastal slave exports to any particular region 
or conflict.52 In addition, on the northern slope and down into the Middle Niger 
Valley, the trans-Atlantic trade competed with the trans-Saharan trade. Still, the post-
1740 increases in slave exports from these Atlantic coasts coincide with a number of 
interior conflicts that expanded trade toward the Atlantic coast in order to secure the 
latest gunpowder technology.53  
 
Thornton (1999) in his book Warfare in Atlantic Africa, 1500-1800, discusses 
Senegambia and Sierra Leone together in chapter two entitled “War in the Rivers.” 
The major political development of the 18th century was the 1726-27 formation of 
51 Northrup (1978) does not see this as a gun-slave cycle, primarily because the region’s history is void of state-
sponsored war: “Rather than being used by armies in warfare, most of the weapons imported by this region must 
have gone into the hands of common people, who used them for hunting, for self-defense, and for firing at funerals 
and other ceremonial occasions, rather than for war (p. 97).” The research by G. Ugo Nwokeji (2010) appears to call 
this view into question. 
52 The Highland Plateau serves as the source of three major rivers: the Niger, the Senegal and the Gambia rivers. 
The Niger flows northeastward into the Middle Niger valley. The Senegal and Gambia flow to the northwest and 
into the Atlantic Ocean along the Senegambia coast. Since the Middle Ages these waterways have integrated the 
trade and politics in the Western Sudan, producing the classic Sudanese Empires of Ghana, Mali and Songhai.  
Falling southward from the highlands, towards the Sierra Leone coast, is a dense system of lesser rivers and streams 
that flow through forest. 
53 Guns tended to come across the Atlantic, while horses (as military technology) tended to come across the Sahara. 
The tse-tse fly of the forest regions effectively limited horses to the drier Sahel. See Law (1980). The case of 
Senegambia is further complicated by the possibility of complementarity or substitutability between gun-slave 
cycles and horse-slave cycles. See Thornton (1999) and Goody (1971) for discussions of the comparative impacts of 
the two military technologies. 
 31 
                                                 
Futa Jallon in the highlands.54  Thornton reports that “…firearms were desired 
everywhere, and it was probably inability to obtain them rather than a rejection of 
their military utility that caused them to be scarce in inland areas like Futa Jallon in 
the 18th century (pp. 46)” The King of Futa Jallon “…appreciated guns, for he sold 
slaves to obtain guns and gunpowder whenever possible (p. 46).” As late as 1794 “… 
guns were still rare…, but Susus, near neighbors who had better coastal access, were 
almost all equipped with guns. The leaders of Futa Jallon were anxious to obtain more 
supplies of Muskets and artillery, and prepared to sell slaves in large numbers to 
acquire them to protect themselves against their enemies (p. 46).”  
 
Curtin et al. (1995, p. 197) claim that the slaves exported from the 18th century 
Senegambia coast were largely Mande victims of the rise and expansion of Bambara 
states in the interior, one of which was Segu.55 Richard Roberts (1987, pp. 58-62) 
describes Segu as a warrior state based on a steady influx of firearms, especially after 
the mid-18th century (p. 35). He also describes how trade shifting towards the Atlantic 
coast to obtain adequate supplies.  
 
“The Middle Niger valley was surrounded by three export regions. 
Trade with the Maghrib, Senegambia and the southern forest zone 
followed different routes…. At least some of the slaves produced by 
the warriors of Segu found their way into the Atlantic economies. 
Even more-direct, however, was the dependence of the Segu political 
economy on firearms, gunpowder, and other European manufactures, 
which could best be supplied through the Atlantic coast trade. 
Demand for these commodities increased the importance of the 
westerly and southwesterly direction of trade (pp. 59-60).”  
 
54 Lovejoy (2016, pp. 36-66) describes how Futa Jallon was the result of Islamic Jihad against non-believers like the 
Ceddi and the emerging Bambara states who were threatening Muslims with enslavement. Backed by scholar 
clerics, merchants and elites, the expressed ideology was the protection of Muslims and the purification of Islamic 
practices. Once successful, the ideology was re-deployed to justify the capture and export of non-Muslim slaves. 
55 “To be ‘Bambara’ in West Africa meant that a person could be enslaved as far as Muslims were concerned 
(Lovejoy 2016, p. 60).” 
 32 
                                                 
These are just a few examples, but they highlight the importance of imported 
gunpowder technology in growing the transatlantic slave trade.56 Many examples can 
also be found among the decentralized societies of West Africa. In fact, most slaves 
may have originated in skirmishes and kidnappings involving decentralized groups 
who were trying to defend against being enslaved by more-centralized societies, 
warlords and bandits. They deployed a variety of defensive strategies like building 
walls (Thornton 1999), moving to rugged terrain (Nunn and Puga 2012), paying 
tribute (Wilks 1975, pp. 19-23) and securing guns and other imported weapons to 
defend themselves (Hawthorne 2003, ch. 3; Klein 2001). The latter strategy, and 
sometimes paying tribute in slaves, pulled these decentralized societies into the orbit 
of the gun-slave cycle. 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This econometric study has documented a gun-slave cycle in the 18th century British 
slave trade. One must ask, then, why historical studies tend to down-play the 
importance of the gun-slave hypothesis. One possible answer is that modern 
Africanist sought, self-consciously, to critique what Joseph Miller calls the “Hamitic 
myth” that African state-formations had been imposed by outsiders (1976, pp. 1-10).57 
The gun-slave hypothesis is sometimes taken to imply that Europeans “forced” 
African societies against their will to capture and export others. This interpretation is 
argued forcefully by Thornton (1998, p. 113-125, 305; 1999, pp. 5, 150-151) who 
turns a hypothesis about productivity into a European conspiracy.  
56 The British were only marginal players in West Central Africa. The Portuguese/Brazilian trade dominated the 
southern hemisphere. Slave exports from West Central Africa averaged approximately 10,000 per year for the 
second half of the 17th century. After 1720 exports exploded to 40,000 per year by the end of the 18th century. 
Concerning the role of gunpowder technology in this region, Miller (1988, p. 104) notes that “[t]he stories 
circulating about the bones of the vanished yielding the gunpowder of the new trade thus expressed the essence of 
the fatal and tragic exchange of people for power in a strikingly accurate metaphor.” 
57 (Miller, 1976, p. 1): “As modern African nations drove towards political independence during the late 1950s and 
early 1960s, historians did their part by searching the African past for precedents which justified the capacity and 
right of Africans to enter Kwame Nkrumah’s long-awaited political kingdom.” Fenoaltea (1999, p.142) uses this 
new emphasis on African agency to defend the “extreme” interpretation of his model of the slave trade: “The prime 
movers of the Atlantic trade are thus seen to be the African elites themselves, as their wealth created the demand for 
imported luxuries and their power the supply of exported slaves. Not long ago, such a view would have been 
anathematized as an attempt to shift the white man's burden of guilt; but now it seems reasonable enough, as it 
recognizes that Africa controlled her own destiny (emphasis added)." 
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 In a sense, the gun-slave cycle can be seen to contain an element of force, if one 
chooses to see it that way (in addition to enslavement). On the African side, people 
are forced (or must choose) to raid-or-be-raided. On the European side, traders are 
forced (or must choose) to sell guns to compete with other traders. But this is not a 
conspiracy. It is the way competition works, and the way competitive markets are 
sustained over the long-term.58 The co-integration equations reported in this paper 
show that gunpowder was integral to the reproduction of the 18th century international 
market for slave. The gun-slave cycle reveals some of the ways Europeans and 
Africans sustained that market, what Davidson (1961, p. 241) calls the “inner-
dynamic of the slaving connection with Europe.” The impulse-response estimates 
show how increases in gunpowder influenced African agency. 
 
Another possible reason why the gun-slave hypothesis has not gained traction is 
because the intertemporal links between weapon imports and slave exports are 
difficult to track. Exchange contracts document cotemporaneous links, but exchange 
contracts do not prove the case, as many historians have pointed out. Intertemporal 
production links, by contrast, are mediated by social processes that take time to 
unfold. This study has shown that it took time for increases in British gunpowder 
imports to work their way through African social relations and increase slave exports. 
And it took time for British traders to read the situation on the coast of Africa and 
respond with additional gunpowder shipments. In the final analysis, the British time-
series reveal how the interactions between these two processes locked the slave trade 
into a self-perpetuating gun-slave cycle, a cycle that generated explosive growth in 
both slave exports and conflict among Africans.  
  
58 Lovejoy (2000) rejects the simple formulation of the gun-slave cycle as a conspiracy and adopts the more-
complex formulation advanced in this study: “The simple formulation of this theory holds that guns were sold to 
Africans in order to encourage enslavement. While some Europeans may have understood the connection between 
guns sales and slaves, it would be wrong to attribute the slave trade to such manipulations. The correlation between 
the quantity of imported guns and the volume of the slave trade more accurately reflect the economic and political 
choices of African rulers and merchants who acted in their own best interests (p. 110, emphasis added).” 
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Figure 3. Time series properties 
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Fig. 7.  Annual volume of the transatlantic slave exports by region, 1640-1807 
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Table 1. Lag order selection statistics 
 
lag LL LR df p FPE AIC HQIC SBIC 
0 -200.91 
   
0.0105 3.96 3.99 4.04 
1 -38.07 325.68 9 0.00 0.0005* 0.97* 1.10* 1.28* 
2 -32.30 11.55 9 0.24 0.0006 1.03 1.25 1.57 
3 -26.34 11.92 9 0.22 0.0006 1.09 1.40 1.86 
4 -19.29 14.10 9 0.12 0.0006 1.13 1.54 2.13 
5 -9.86 18.871* 9 0.03 0.0006 1.12 1.62 2.35 
6 -7.96 3.79 9 0.93 0.0007 1.26 1.85 2.72 
 
Notes: 103 observations. Tests are run using the STATA varsoc command. Varsoc reports the final 
prediction error (FPE), Akaike's information criterion (AIC), Schwarz's Bayesian information 
criterion (SBIC), and the Hannan and Quinn information criterion (HQIC) lag-order selection 
statistics for a series of vector autoregressions of order, in this case, 1,..,maxlag(6).  A sequence of 
likelihood-ratio (LR) test statistics for all the full VARs of order less than or equal to the highest lag 
order is also reported. The preestimation version of varsoc can also be used to select the lag order for 
a vector error-correction model (VECM).  As shown by Nielsen (2001), the lag-order selection 
























Notes: 108 observations. * denotes p<.05. The Johansen rank test is a nested test. If the trace statistic 
for rank=0 is less than the 5% critical value, then the test fails to reject rank=0 for the matrix. If this is 
the case, then the variables are I(1), not co-integrated and OLS in differences can be applied. If the 
trace statistic for rank=0 is greater than the 5% critical value, then the Johansen test proceeds to test 
for rank=1. If the test fails to reject rank=1 then the matrix of coefficients has rank=1 and the 
variables are I(1) and co-integrated. If the test rejects rank=1 then the Johansen test proceeds to test 
for rank=2. If the Johansen test rejects all possible ranks, then the variables are I(0) and OLS in levels 










No trend (γ = τ =  v =  ρ = 0) 
0 0 -75.79 . 24.40 24.31 
1 5 -66.80 0.15 6.4282* 12.53 
2 8 -63.59 0.06 0.01 3.84 
3 9 -63.59 0.00 
  
Unrestricted constant ( τ =  ρ = 0)  
0 3 -75.47 . 48.73 29.68 
1 8 -61.43 0.23 20.65 15.41 
2 11 -53.45 0.14 4.70 3.76 
3 12 -51.11 0.04 
  
Restricted constant (γ =  τ = ρ = 0) 
0 0 -75.79 . 49.36 34.91 
1 6 -61.73 0.23 21.25 19.96 
2 10 -53.69 0.14 5.1785* 9.42 
3 12 -51.11 0.05 
  
Unrestricted trend (γ, τ, v and ρ are estimated) 
0 6 -75.31 . 82.03 34.55 
1 11 -54.45 0.32 40.30 18.17 
2 14 -41.82 0.21 15.05 3.74 
3 15 -34.30 0.13 
  
Restricted trend ( τ = 0) 
0 3 -75.47 . 82.34 42.44 
1 9 -54.56 0.32 40.52 25.32 
2 13 -41.89 0.21 15.18 12.25 
3 15 -34.30 0.13 
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Table 3. Lagrange multiplier tests for autocorrelation   
Model 1: r(1), t(n) Model 2: r(2), t(rc)  
variable lag order (1); 108 obs. 
error lag order chi2 Prob>chi2 chi2 Prob>chi2 
1 20.35 0.016 12.56 0.183 
2 12.29 0.198 10.97 0.277 
3 19.57 0.021 14.37 0.110 
4 13.58 0.138 16.53 0.057 
5 9.57 0.386 7.43 0.593  
variable lag order (2); 107 obs. 
1 20.86 0.013 19.06 0.025 
2 16.49 0.057 15.84 0.070 
3 11.13 0.267 7.25 0.611 
4 12.47 0.188 13.66 0.135 
5 9.13 0.425 6.98 0.639  
variable lag order (3); 106 obs. 
1 20.20 0.017 12.46 0.189 
2 11.95 0.216 11.50 0.243 
3 19.58 0.021 13.73 0.132 
4 13.69 0.134 16.75 0.053 
5 9.36 0.405 7.49 0.586  
variable lag order (4); 105 obs. 
1 21.39 0.011 22.91 0.006 
2 8.48 0.486 8.44 0.490 
3 15.59 0.076 15.20 0.086 
4 15.11 0.088 16.61 0.055 
5 8.74 0.462 5.14 0.822  
variable lag order (5); 104 obs. 
1 2.93 0.967 3.746 0.927 
2 6.01 0.739 8.861 0.450 
3 7.70 0.565 5.665 0.773 
4 7.55 0.580 4.488 0.876 
5 9.68 0.377 8.366 0.498 
 
Notes. The STATA command veclmar implements a Lagrange- multiplier (LM) test for 
autocorrelation in the residuals of the vector error-correction models (VECMs) Model1 and Model 2. 
The Null Hypothesis is no autocorrelation at the specified lag order. The residual autocorrelation 




Table 4.  Long-run equilibrium relationships 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model W2 Model W2.1 
Equation 1 




∆lnSLAVESt-1 (βs) 1 1 1 1     
   
∆lnGUNPOWDERt-1 (βg) 1.86*** (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)   
(0.45) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)  
∆lnCARGOt-1 (βc) -2.21*** -0.28*** -0.30*** -0.30***   
(0.34) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)  
CONSTANT 
 
-6.58*** -6.30*** -6.30***    
(0.69) (0.70) (0.56) 
Equation 2 




∆lnSLAVESt-1 (βs)  (omitted) (omitted) -4.39***    
(omitted) (omitted) (0.45)  
∆lnGUNPOWDERt-1 (βg)  1 1 1     
   
∆lnCARGOt-1 (βc)  -1.01*** -1.33*** (omitted)    
(0.12) (0.14) (omitted)  
CONSTANT 
 
3.20** 7.65*** 35.29***    
(1.48) (1.71) (4.49) 
 
Notes: 104 observations. Equations are estimated using Johansen’s maximum likelihood method with 
5-period lags. The top panel (Equation 1) reports estimated long-run equilibrium relationships when 
slave exports are set equal to one. The second panel (Equation 2) reports estimated long-run 
equilibrium relationships when gunpowder imports are set equal to one. Model 1 and Model 2 use 
unweighted gunpowder imports. Model W2 and W2.1 use gunpowder imports weighted by the share 





Table 5. Speed of adjustments parameters 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model W2 Model W2.1 
Equation 1 Adjustments when ∆lnSLAVESt-1 is above long-run equilibrium 
 ∆lnSLAVESt (αs) -0.04 -0.56*** -0.53*** 0.14 
 
 
(0.04) (0.14) (0.14) (0.34) 
 ∆lnGUNPOWDERt (αg) -0.09 -0.46** -0.54** -0.07 
 
 
(0.06) (0.20) (0.24) (0.59)  ∆lnCARGOt (αc) 0.03 -0.47** -0.44** 0.98* 
 
 
(0.07) (0.22) (0.21) (0.52) 
Equation 2 Adjustments when ∆lnGUNPOWDERt-1 is above long-run equilibrium 
 ∆lnSLAVESt (αs)  0.12 0.15* 0.15* 
 
  
(0.09) (0.08) (0.08) 
 ∆lnGUNPOWDERt (αg)  -0.04 0.11 0.11 
 
  
(0.13) (0.14) (0.14) 
 ∆lnCARGOt (αc)  0.23 0.32*** 0.32*** 
 
  
(0.14) (0.12) (0.12) 
 
Notes: 104 observations. The top panel (Equation 1) reports estimated speed-of-adjustment 
parameters when slave exports are above long-run equilibrium. The second panel (Equation 2) 
reports speed-of-adjustment parameters when gunpowder imports are above long-run equilibrium. 
Model 1 and Model 2 use unweighted gunpowder imports. Model W2 and W2.1 use gunpowder 
imports weighted by the share of British trade in its 18 major trading ports. Equations are estimated 





Table 6. Past-dependence   
Model 2 and 2.1 Model W2 and W2.1 
 ∆lnSLAVESt ∆lnGUNPOWDERt ∆lnCARGOt ∆lnSLAVESt ∆lnGUNPOWDERt ∆lnCARGOt 
∆lnSLAVESt-1 0.25 0.86*** 0.52* 0.17 0.88*** 0.46  
(0.19) (0.27) (0.29) (0.19) (0.32) (0.28) 
∆lnSLAVESt-2 0.11 0.56** 0.48* 0.06 0.73** 0.45  
(0.19) (0.27) (0.29) (0.18) (0.32) (0.28) 
∆lnSLAVESt-3 0.18 0.64** 0.47* 0.12 0.42 0.50*  
(0.18) (0.26) (0.27) (0.17) (0.30) (0.27) 
∆lnSLAVESt-4 -0.05 0.02 0.05 -0.06 -0.05 0.04  
(0.17) (0.25) (0.26) (0.16) (0.28) (0.25) 
       
∆lnGUNPOWDERt-1 -0.02 -0.38** -0.20 0.02 -0.68*** -0.25  
(0.13) (0.18) (0.19) (0.11) (0.19) (0.17) 
∆lnGUNPOWDERt-2 0.03 -0.20 -0.07 0.06 -0.33 -0.14  
(0.12) (0.18) (0.19) (0.12) (0.20) (0.18) 
∆lnGUNPOWDERt-3 0.02 -0.13 -0.09 0.00 -0.15 -0.18  
(0.11) (0.16) (0.17) (0.11) (0.18) (0.16) 
∆lnGUNPOWDERt-4 0.04 -0.14 -0.12 0.07 -0.07 -0.16  
(0.10) (0.14) (0.15) (0.08) (0.14) (0.12) 
       
∆lnCARGOt-1 -0.06 -0.27 -0.24 -0.02 0.14 -0.08  
(0.13) (0.19) (0.20) (0.13) (0.23) (0.20) 
∆lnCARGOt-2 0.02 -0.15 -0.25 0.02 -0.11 -0.14  
(0.13) (0.19) (0.20) (0.13) (0.22) (0.20) 
∆lnCARGOt-3 -0.20 -0.38** -0.40** -0.15 -0.30 -0.31*  
(0.12) (0.18) (0.19) (0.12) (0.21) (0.19) 
∆lnCARGOt-4 0.16 0.26 0.11 0.16 0.17 0.17  
(0.12) (0.18) (0.19) (0.12) (0.20) (0.18) 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 104 observations. Equations are estimated using Johansen’s maximum likelihood method.  The 
maximum lag order is 5 periods. Model 1 and Model 2 use unweighted gunpowder imports. Model W2 and W2.1 use gunpowder imports 
weighted by the share of British trade in its 18 major trading ports. 
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Table 7. Sensitivity tests of alternative measure of CARGO 
  
Models 2 and 2.1 Model W2 and W2.1   Est. of αs Est. of αs 
ln(cargo) 0.117 0.151*  
(0.092) (0.078) 
ln(cargo1) 0.117 0.146*  
(0.089) (0.077) 
ln(cargo_nog) 0.119 0.150**  
(0.088) (0.075) 
ln(cargo1_nog) 0.120 0.144**  
(0.085) (0.073) 
ln(exports) 0.098 0.134*  
(0.090) (0.075) 
ln(exports1) 0.108 0.133*  
(0.084) (0.072) 
ln(exports_nog) 0.101 0.132*  
(0.086) (0.070) 
ln(exports1_nog) 0.111 0.131*  
(0.080) (0.068) 
 
Notes: 104 observations. Alternative measures of CARGO are substituted for CARGO and the 
VECM is re-estimated. The table reports the resulting speed of adjustment parameter 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠. The original 
measure of cargo = British exports - African imports. Alternative measures are these: cargo1 = cargo 
- indirect African imports; cargo_nog = cargo – gunpowder; cargo1_nog = cargo1 – gunpowder. 
Exports = British exports, and the other Export measures follow the same pattern as the 
corresponding cargo measures. Model 2 use unweighted gunpowder imports. Model W2 and W2.1 
use gunpowder imports weighted by the share of British trade in its 18 major trading ports.*** 




Table 8. Placebo tests on guns-for-slaves-in-production (𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠)  
Models 2 and 2.1 Models W2 and W2.1  Est. of α Est. of α 
ln(gunpowder) 0.117 0.151*  
(0.092) (0.078) 
ln(salt) 0.014 0.013  
(0.017) (0.016) 
ln(british cottons) 0.030 0.035  
(0.033) (0.031) 
ln(woolens) -0.148* -0.121  
(0.076) (0.080) 
ln(linen) -0.007 0.042  
(0.040) (0.061) 
ln(Indian piece goods) 0.053 0.082  
(0.064) (0.062) 
ln(other textiles) 0.119 0.221*  
(0.122) (0.123) 
ln(iron and steel) 0.133 0.175  
(0.120) (0.108) 
ln(copper and brass) -0.015 0.012  
(0.072) (0.073) 
ln(other metals) 0.008 0.088  
(0.105) (0.115) 
ln(alcoholic beverages) -0.076 0.000  
(0.098) (0.087) 
ln(tobacco products) 0.064 0.090  
(0.099) (0.081) 
ln(cowries) -0.044* -0.044  
(0.025) (0.027) 
ln(beads) -0.024 0.008  
(0.060) (0.065) 
ln(glass) 0.127** 0.128**  
(0.059) (0.052) 
ln(wooden products) 0.027 0.041  
(0.055) (0.048) 
ln(misc. mfr.) 0.107** 0.099**  
(0.043) (0.038) 
ln(wrought iron) 0.157* 0.179**  
(0.083) (0.078) 
Notes: 104 observations. Alternative imports are substituted for GUNPOWDER and the VECM is re-
estimated. The table reports the resulting speed of adjustment parameter, 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠. See text for a discussion 
of the placebo products. Model 2 and 2.1 use unweighted placebo imports. Models W2 and W2.1 use 
placebo imports weighted by the share of British trade in its 18 major trading ports. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 9. OLS estimates of the slave export equation 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES ∆lnSLAVESt ∆lnSLAVESt ∆lnSLAVESt 
  (unweighted) (unweighted) (weighted) 
    
∆lnSLAVESt−1  -0.33*** -0.36***   
(0.10) (0.10) 
∆lnSLAVESt−2  -0.36*** -0.42***   
(0.08) (0.07) 
∆lnSLAVESt−3  -0.27** -0.30***   
(0.11) (0.08) 
∆lnSLAVESt−4  -0.18* -0.18**   
(0.10) (0.08) 
∆lnGUNPOWDERt 0.13** 0.21* 0.17**  
(0.07) (0.10) (0.08) 
∆lnGUNPOWDERt−1  0.18** 0.26***   
(0.08) (0.07) 
∆lnGUNPOWDERt−2  0.14* 0.20***   
(0.07) (0.06) 
∆lnGUNPOWDERt−3  0.11 0.12**   
(0.07) (0.06) 
∆lnGUNPOWDERt−4  0.12* 0.15***   
(0.06) (0.04) 
∆lnCARGOt 0.44*** 0.40*** 0.42***  
(0.08) (0.11) (0.09) 
∆lnCARGOt−1  0.12 0.05   
(0.10) (0.07) 
∆lnCARGOt−2  0.18** 0.14*   
(0.08) (0.07) 
∆lnCARGOt−3  0.05 0.06   
(0.10) (0.09) 
∆lnCARGOt−4  0.10 0.10   
(0.10) (0.08) 
Constant -0.01 -0.03 -0.03*  
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)     
F-statistic 54.54 33.25 53.27 
Observations 108 104 104 
 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Newey-West standard errors are reported in the parentheses. 
The maximum lag order is 5 periods. Columns 1 and 2 use unweighted gunpowder imports. Column 




Table 10. Potential instrumental variable for gunpowder imports 
(Dependent variable = ∆lnGUNPOWDERt) 
 






   
t+3 0.02 0.02 0.00  
(0.03) (0.11) (0.02) 
t+2, 0.05*** 0.04 0.02  
(0.02) (0.09) (0.02) 
t+1 0.07*** -0.18 -0.02  
(0.03) (0.15) (0.02) 
t 0.08** -0.23* -0.02  
(0.03) (0.12) (0.03) 
t-1 0.01 0.03 -0.03  
(0.02) (0.11) (0.04) 
t-2 -0.01 -0.12 -0.01  
(0.02) (0.13) (0.03) 
t-3 -0.00 -0.20 -0.02  
(0.02) (0.14) (0.02) 
Constant 0.03 0.03 0.03  
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)     
F-stat 4.57*** 2.05** 2.66* 
Observations 94 102 102 
 
Notes: Newey-West standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
EXCESS_CAPACITY is the previous maximum level of British central government’s expenditure 
on ordnances minus the current level of central government spending on ordnances. WARS is a 
dummy variable that take the value 1 during war years, zero otherwise. WAR CASUALTIES are the 














































Notes: Estimated by GMM. Newey-West standard errors are reported in parentheses. The number of lags is 5 
years. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
(a) Second stage: Dep. var. = ∆lnSLAVESt 
Variables (1) (2)  
Unweighted Weighted 
∆lnGUNPOWDERt−1 0.19** 0.18**  
(0.08) (0.07) 
∆lnGUNPOWDERt 0.17*** 0.14  
(0.06) (0.10) 
∆lnCARGOt 0.43*** 0.45***  
(0.09) (0.11) 
Constant -0.01 -0.02*  
(0.01) (0.01) 
R-squared 0.55 0.58 
Hanson J-statistic for 
over-identification. Chi-sq(2) p-value 
0.62 0.56 
Stock-Yogo critical F-stat for 20% 
maximal relative bias 
6.46 6.46 
(b) First stage: Dep. var. = ∆lnGUNPOWDERt-1 
 (1) (2)  
Unweighted Weighted 
∆lnGUNPOWDERt -0.25* -0.29***  
(0.13) (0.08) 
∆lnCARGOt -0.05 -0.01  
(0.13) (0.12) 
∆lnEXCESS_CAPACITYt+1 0.07*** 0.07**  
(0.02) (0.03) 
∆lnEXCESS_CAPACITYt 0.10*** 0.10***  
(0.02) (0.03) 
∆lnEXCESS_CAPACITYt-1 0.07** 0.06  
(0.03) (0.04) 
Constant 0.04** 0.05**  
(0.02) (0.02) 
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 7.22 3.79 
Shea Partial R-squared 0.16 0.12 
Observations 98 98 
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